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The Limitations of Dialectical Behaviour Therapy and Psychodynamic 
Therapies of Suicidality from an Existential-Phenomenological Perspective 
 





Suicidality, a significant problem in New Zealand for the past decade or so, has invited a 
substantial body of research into causes and prevention. However, given the effort, the prevention 
results do not appear to be sufficiently convincing when coroners’ views are considered. This 
paper focuses on two mainstream therapeutic approaches towards persons with borderline 
personality disorder, in which suicidal behaviour is a prominent feature demanding 
understanding and active attention. It is argued that dialectical behaviour therapy and 
psychoanalytically informed therapies are lacking on two accounts. Firstly, the philosophical and 
methodological underpinnings of both approaches perpetuate what Heidegger refers to as the 
compound misunderstanding of ourselves as human beings. Secondly, what this translates into is a 
practice which forgets the human order and misunderstands the experience of the singular human 
present in despair. As an alternative approach towards dealing with suicide in practice, the 
author presents concepts central to Heidegger’s phenomenology of human existence and discusses 






For the past decade or so, suicide has been a chronic 
problem in New Zealand which has invited 
considerable research into causes and prevention, and 
is considered to be one of thirteen health priorities for 
the Ministry of Health (Beautrais, 2000a, 2000b, 
2001; Beautrais, Collings, Ehrhardt, & Ehrhardt, 
2005; Beautrais, Joyce, & Mulder, 1998; Disley & 
Coggan, 1996; Ministry of Health, 2001, 2004, 
2006a, 2006b). Warwick Holmes, a coroner, is 
reportedly troubled that New Zealand does not appear 
to be making any progress with preventing suicide 
amongst young men. He advocates that more 
attention be paid to the problem (The Dominion Post, 
2006). But how have we been paying attention to 
date? Our quantifying questions seem to conceal 
rather than reveal, and in our practice we seem to 
have forgotten the ‘who’ that is suicidal. 
 
The Royal Australian and New Zealand College of 
Psychiatrists has this to say in its guidelines to reduce 
deliberate self-harm: “Cognitive-behavioural therapy 
(CBT) and problem-orientated approaches appear 
promising for reducing repeated self-harm for most 
patient groups but no single treatment has confirmed 
superiority. Dialectical behaviour therapy (DBT) 
appears to confer most benefit” (Boyce, Carter, 
Penrose-Wall, Wilhelm, & Goldney, 2003, p. 150). 
Dialectical behaviour therapy and cognitive 
behavioural therapy seem to be the preferred forms of 
treatment for suicidality in New Zealand. I will 
consider these approaches and also briefly consider 
psychodynamic therapies. All these approaches, 
however, have significant limitations from an 
existential-phenomenological perspective. 
 
Heidegger (1927/1962) says that understanding 
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precedes interpretation, that doing understands. The 
problem with dialectical behaviour therapy and 
psychodynamic therapies is that there is a disjunction 
between understanding and doing. This disjunction is, 
according to Needleman (in Binswanger, 1975), the 
result of “incompatible conceptual horizons” of 
understanding. To highlight this, I will discuss 
concepts central to Heidegger’s phenomenology of 
human existence and consider their capacity to inform 
and enhance the treatment of suicidal patients in a 
manner which does not forget who. 
 
Most research into the mechanisms of change of 
various therapies focuses on the diagnostic category 
of borderline personality disorder (BPD) (Clarkin & 
Levy, 2006). This diagnostic group is identified by, 
inter alia, the prominent and perplexing symptom of 
parasuicidality. Parasuicidal behaviour is predictive 
of suicidality, and patients who have borderline 
personality disorders have an estimated suicide 
completion rate of between 8% and 10% (Levy et al., 
2006). Suicidality is considered to be the result of two 
core personality traits that characterize much of the 
phenotypic variations seen in BPD - impulsivity and 
negative affectivity/emotional dysregulation (Clarkin 
& Levy, 2006). 
  
Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT) / Cognitive 
Behaviour Therapy (CBT) and Suicidality 
 
According to cognitive theory, dysfunctional beliefs 
stem from negative learning experiences in childhood. 
These beliefs endure into adulthood, are inflexible in 
nature, and lead to cognitive distortions. It is 
hypothesized that the principal mechanism for change 
in cognitive therapy is the modification of 
dysfunctional beliefs, and the results of one open 
clinical trail report significant decreases in suicide 
ideation (Wenzel, Chapman, Newman, Beck, & 
Brown, 2006). Focusing almost exclusively on 
helping patients to change their thoughts, feelings and 
behaviours is often not palatable to BPD patients, and 
awareness of this led to Linehan’s development of 
dialectical behaviour therapy (Lynch, Chapman, 
Rosenthal, Kuo, & Linehan, 2006). 
 
It is now well established, according to some 
researchers, that dialectical behaviour therapy (DBT) 
is perhaps the most “specific effective psycho-
therapeutic intervention” to reduce “life-threatening 
impulse-control disorders” such as borderline 
personality disorder, in which suicide is a significant 
feature (Boyce, Carter, Penrose-Wall, Wilhelm, & 
Goldney, 2003; Goldney, 2005; Linehan, Heard, & 
Armstrong, 1993; Lynch et al., 2006; Verheul et al., 
2003).  
 
Linehan’s thesis is that “borderline individuals are 
emotionally vulnerable as well as deficient in 
emotional modulation skills, and that these difficulties 
have their roots in biological predispositions, which 
are exacerbated by specific environmental experi-
ences” (1993, p. 43). Her approach applies a wide 
range of cognitive behavioural techniques to the 
treatment of the borderline personality disordered 
person, with an overriding emphasis on dialectics, 
defined as “the reconciliation of opposites in the 
continual process of synthesis” (1993, p. 19). 
  
Perseius, Öjehagen, Ekdahl, Åsberg, & Samuelsson 
(2003) set out to determine how dialectical behaviour 
therapy is perceived by both patients with borderline 
personality disorder and their DBT therapists. The 
study concluded that dialectical behaviour therapy 
resulted in a significant decline in suicidal attempts 
and acts of self-harm. The patient participants 
attributed this to experiencing respect, understanding 
and confirmation from the DBT therapists. In 
addition, they considered the DBT skills crucial in 
conquering suicidal and self-harm impulses. The 
therapist participants concurred with these findings in 
their narrative accounts. In addition, the therapist 
participants attributed the success of the DBT 
approach to the “theoretical underpinnings” and “the 
therapeutic techniques”, holding that “the personality 
of the therapist is of minor importance”. The 
therapists also felt that it was critical to adhere to the 
therapeutic manual and stated that failures occur 
when therapists “don’t stick to the manual” and work 
“by ‘their own heads’” (Perseius et al., 2003, p. 224). 
 
A major inadequacy, from an existential-
phenomenological perspective, is that DBT does not 
provide insight into what suicidality means for the 
participants or how they experience and understand 
this phenomenon in treatment. From the preceding 
outline, it should be clear that, in Linehan’s view, 
BPD patients who commit suicide are predisposed to 
do so due to biological and genetic factors as a first 
cause. Environmental factors merely exacerbate what 
has already been determined in the constitution of a 
person as an organism. This understanding in practice 
is clearly in violation of Linehan’s own philosophical 
principle of “wholeness” (Linehan, 1993). There is no 
evidence of a true synthesis in understanding the 
what, how and who of human existence, that is, 
Being-in-the-world (Binswanger, 1958). The theory 
and description of an organism determines a different 
relationship to the theory and description of a person 
(Laing, 1965). This disjunction between intention and 
practice in DBT is prevalent in the rationalist 
positivist philosophy and epistemology that 
dominates the field of psychiatry and scientific 
psychology. 
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 In what has now come to be widely referred to as 
“evidence based practice”, standard behavioural 
modification techniques appear to be successful 
regardless of the phenomenon of intent. They are 
claimed to be successful with suicidal individuals, 
and equally successful with all the syndromes that fall 
within the diagnostic parameters of anxiety and 
depression, according to a number of researchers 
(Beck, 1976; Beck & Emery, 1985; Beck, Rush, 
Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Heimberg, 1993; 
Meichenbaum, 1977; O’Leary & Wilson, 1975; Rush, 
1982; Zinbarg, 1993). Reliance on technique-driven 
therapies, and the application thereof across a 
disparate range of phenomena, suggests two things. 
Firstly, the person is not primarily understood in his 
or her specific life-world, but made to fit the 
theoretical representation of being human. Secondly, 
technique-driven therapies reflect upon the attitude 
brought to the relationship by the therapist, and as 
such represent intent. The therapist no longer “trusts 
what meets the eye and the ear”, says Cohn (2002), 
and needs to devise interpretive means to decipher 
phenomena. Therapists no longer trust what the 
person present has to say, and have come to distrust 
the adequacy of their understanding by virtue of their 
own humanness. But how do two nobodies meet one 
another as somebody? “My thesis is limited to the 
contention that the theory of man as a person loses its 
way if it falls into an account of man as a machine or 
man as an organismic system of it-processes” (Laing, 
1965, p. 23). 
 
The aforementioned research by Perseius et al. (2003) 
further strengthens the argument that scientific 
psychology is divided in its intent and practice, 
considering a person as a behaving organism and 
relating to him as a person. This creates confusion 
and doubt when matching the intent of research with 
its outcome. In that study, the patients attributed the 
success of dialectical behaviour therapy to feeling 
respected and understood. Yet the therapists attributed 
the success of treatment to the “minor importance” of 
their personalities as therapists and claimed that 
failure occurs when therapists work “by their own 
heads” and fail to “stick to the manual”. I cannot say 
how manuals of treatment impart an understanding of 
another person, other than in a vaguely aggregate 
manner, and even that is debatable. How is it possible 
to be understood by another person when that person, 
honouring the methodology of natural science, 
consciously and deliberately presents him or herself 
as an objective entity that administers a pre-designed 
procedure to address the plight of a singular person 
present? In my view, it would seem that the success 
of dialectical behaviour therapy for suicidality is not 
attributable to what therapists consciously do, but 
rather the result of what they think they deliberately 
do not do. They seem to have a therapeutic effect 
despite themselves. If this kind of self-deception is 
the case, then how is it possible to know why a 
particular activity has a certain effect? This telling 
oversight clearly demonstrates the phenomenologist’s 
challenge to the validity and reliability of research 
where the researchers do not consider their personal 
contribution to the research process and outcome, and 
believe that they are “dispassionate observers”. It 
brings doubt to the claim that dialectical behaviour 
therapy is the most specific affective psycho-
therapeutic intervention to reduce life threatening 
impulse-control disorders when the reason for its 
effectiveness is so misunderstood. That DBT 
therapists have a therapeutic effect despite themselves 
illustrates, I believe, the Heideggarian notion of 
“language as Being-with”. There appears to exist a 
fundamental understanding for the patient of which 
the therapist is unaware, an understanding forgotten 
by a mind imprisoned by the cookbook-like dictates 
of scientifically inspired treatment manuals and the 
procedures of “evidence based practice”. “The 
existential-ontological foundation of language is 
discourse or talk”, and discourse “is existentially 
equiprimordial with state-of-mind and understanding” 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 203). Our communication 
does not start with hearing any words, but with 
attunement-with and understanding-with. It is 
Heidegger’s contention that both talking and hearing 
are based upon understanding. This understanding 
does not arise through talking and hearing, because 
only “he who already understands can listen” 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 208). Language makes 
understanding explicit; it manifests what is originally 
understood. Heidegger seems to be suggesting that 
our primordial listening-with and our understanding-
with are an ineffable experiencing with another, and 
that language is an approximation of this experience. 
The world we share with others as meaningful speaks 
to us before words are used, says Cohn (2002). 
 
The self-deception evident in the aforementioned 
research resonates with Heidegger’s view of the 
compounded misunderstanding of Dasein. “The Self 
of everyday Dasein is the they-self, which we 
distinguish from authentic Self - that is, from the Self 
which has been taken hold of in its own way” 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 167). Our fundamental 
way of being is they-Being, and in this way we are 
fundamentally historical. The human being is always 
thrown into a historical world and has to come to its 
own interpretation of world out of this historical 
context. Because we deal with things in this ‘they’ 
way, Dasein is fundamentally self-misinterpreting. It 
is not that we have the wrong theory of ourselves or 
that we read too much Descartes. It is rather that, 
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because we start off as ‘they’, we interpret things in 
an inauthentic way, including our own Being. This 
misunderstanding is compounded by the sciences, and 
the human sciences in particular, which make the 
‘categorical error’ of interpreting the nature of being 
via categories of knowledge such as psychology, 
anthropology and theology. These categories of 
knowledge fail to do justice to an understanding of 
human existence. These categories do not take the 
existence of Dasein into full account, says Heidegger. 
“We must rather choose such a way of access and 
such a kind of interpretation that this entity can show 
itself in itself and from itself” (1927/1962, p. 37).  
 
At the heart of cognitive and behavioural therapies 
lies the Cartesian-inspired notion of “a mind” that 
exists without a world. The mind can have thoughts 
and feelings regardless of the world - I think therefore 
I am. Whilst this is one mode of Being (as a 
categorical structure of existence), it is not the Being 
of Dasein. Whether Dasein exists authentically or 
inauthentically, the character of this existence must be 
understood a priori as grounded in a state of Being 
that Heidegger (1927/1962) refers to as Being-in-the-
world. This compound expression indicates a unitary 
phenomenon. Human existence is grounded in our 
always already finding ourselves in the world.  Dasein 
exists (ek-stasis) outside itself. There is no inner or 
outer. “The Dasein which knows remains outside, and 
it does so as Dasein” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 89). 
Inner and outer explains something about Dasein as a 
categorical structure of knowledge, insofar as it offers 
a theoretical understanding of being human, but it 
does not give an ontological explication of the Being 
that exists  -  the ‘who’ that is knowing. 
 
To “exist as Dasein means to hold open a domain 
through its capacity to receive-perceive the 
significance of the things that are given to it [Dasein] 
and that addresses it [Dasein] by virtue of its own 
‘clearing’” (Heidegger, 2001, p. 4). Heidegger is 
emphatic that human existence cannot be objectified, 
because the significance of things received-perceived 
is such by virtue of human existence in itself. There is 
no subject to be separated from an object. The 
existence of both is interdependent. Without one, 
there is no other, and in therapy there thus cannot be 
an object (therapist) and a subject (patient), nor an 
‘inside’ subject, nor experiences that can be measured 
or encapsulated by theoretical representations, 
without forgetting that the world of a therapeutic 
encounter is the ‘clearing’ where the significance of 
what is received-perceived is laid bare for the first 
time by Being-with one another. It is for this reason 
that aggregating methods and techniques of therapy 
are unsuited for the purpose within the context of 
existential therapy, because ‘method and technique’ 
are born in each unique ‘clearing’ of Being-with. A 
therapy designed to treat suicidality with a certain 
method because it correlates with a predetermined 
factor, violates a basic structure of human existence, 
and thereby fails to render a sound understanding of 
what it may mean to be suicidal. 
 
Psychodynamic Therapies and Suicidal Behaviour 
 
According to psychoanalytic theory, suicide is a self-
destructive act aimed at an “introjected object” or the 
result of the “death instinct” (Rycroft, 1972). Rycroft 
defines introjection as occurring when an external 
object is made into a mental representation and the 
relationship with the object ‘out there’ is replaced by 
one with an imagined object ‘inside’. Whilst “no 
biological observational can be found to support the 
idea of a death instinct” (Rycroft, 1972, p. 27), it is 
postulated in psychoanalytic theories that all organic 
life shows a tendency towards breaking down into 
more simple forms (Kruger, 1979). May (1977) 
suggests that Freud was probably struggling with the 
concept of existential anxiety when he postulated the 
death instinct in conflict with the life instinct.  
 
Suicide, in the psychoanalytic tradition, is closely 
associated with aggression, a derivative in service of 
“the two great primary instincts of man: hunger and 
love” (Riviere, 1967, p. 3). Kernberg (1975) suggests 
that suicidality occurs in those who have yet to 
resolve preoedipal conflicts. It is a developmental 
stage dominated by the undifferentiated impulses 
(instincts) of primitive aggression and sex: the giving 
and taking of life in service of self-preservation. Due 
to this ‘primitive’ character structure, a person 
responds with indiscriminate aggression towards 
others or himself (self-mutilation and suicidal acts) 
when gratification of these impulses is frustrated. 
This postulated impelling behaviour seems to inform 
Kernberg’s statement about the treatment of BPD that 
a person may use “threats of suicide to control his 
environment (including the psychotherapist)” (1975, 
p. 90). Suicide is thus a means intended to manipulate 
the world to derive satisfaction. It is seen as an 
impulsive aggressive act in retaliation to frustration. 
David Malan (1979) suggests that suicide may be the 
outcome of the psychological impasse when anger 
and guilt or anger and love are ‘fused’. The inability 
to differentiate and locate the aim of these opposing 
feelings causes psychic pain which is often resolved 
through suicide. Suicide thus seems to be caused by a 
mood of some unresolved frustration. 
 
Our attunement or state-of-mind is one of the 
structures which are definitive of human existence. 
Heidegger suggests that moods are not something 
below the level of disclosure or truth or how the 
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world comes to us, but something quite fundamental. 
And we are always, he says, in some mood. Mood 
determines the way in which things come to us out of 
the world and how it is disclosed; it is what allows the 
world to matter. “A mood makes manifest ‘how one 
is, and how one is faring’. In this ‘how one is’, having 
a mood brings Being to its ‘there’” (Heidegger, 1927/ 
1962, p. 173). To articulate this sense that mood is 
primordial and beyond rational control, that one 
discovers oneself in some sort of mood at a given 
time, Heidegger employs the term “thrownness” and 
“being delivered over”. We do not know the ‘whence’ 
or the ‘whither’ of our mood, merely the fact that we 
find ourselves thrown there. In mood, Dasein is 
disclosed to itself “prior to all cognition and volition, 
and beyond their range of disclosure” (Heidegger, 
1927/1962, p. 175). Phenomenologically speaking, 
we will fail to recognize what the mood discloses and 
how it discloses if we attempt to explain what Dasein 
knows and believes, or is acquainted with at the time 
of a particular mood, says Heidegger. In other words, 
seeking a rationale for something that is by nature 
irrational is to not see it at all. Kernberg’s reason for 
the dark mood of anger which may lead to suicide is 
that it spells the beginning of reason that does not see 
at all. 
 
More recent literature suggests that psycho-
analytically informed therapies are successful in 
treating suicidality. After a year of twice weekly 
psychotherapeutic treatment of 30 patients diagnosed 
with BPD, Stevenson and Meares (1992) report a 
significant improvement in key diagnostic indicators, 
such as self-harm and suicidality. Bateman and 
Fonagy (2001) report a similar result in their study of 
BPD patients who completed a psychoanalytically 
orientated partial hospitalization programme. 
According to Kernberg (1975), BPD patients have 
difficulty integrating disparate representations of 
themselves and others because negative emotions, 
such as aggression, disrupt their capacity to integrate 
these partial representations. “Strong, unmetabolized 
or unprocessed emotions have the capacity to 
overwhelm positive representations”, says Kernberg 
(Levy et al., 2006, p. 484). This idea of a lack of 
conscious differentiation, which is at the heart of the 
BPD syndrome, is also evident in Malan’s (1979) 
view to understanding and treating suicide when 
associated with depression and aggression. According 
to him, depression and aggression can be 
therapeutically treated by ‘working through’ the 
depressive position - a term coined by Klein (1934), 
and extensively rearticulated by Winnicott, to 
describe the realization that love and hate are directed 
towards the same person. This lack of differentiation 
and integration of internal images of self and others is 
called identity diffusion (Levy et al., 2006).  
An equiprimordial constitutive of Dasein is 
understanding. Understanding doesn’t mean here a 
kind of cognizing in the sense that Kant would use it, 
or Kernberg with his “patients that are having 
difficulty integrating disparate representations of 
themselves”; it is not some particular competence to 
carry out some given task, but rather Dasein’s own 
competence in Being as such. It is not that we first 
exist and then later understand some things; our 
existing is a matter of understanding world. Dasein is 
thrown into the world of ‘they’. It is not a world of its 
choosing, nor is it a world where it can predict what is 
revealed. “And in so far as understanding is 
accompanied by state-of-mind and as such is 
existentially surrendered to thrownness, Dasein has in 
every case already gone astray and failed to recognize 
itself” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 184). In Kernberg’s 
treatment approach, as in Malan’s, the patient’s 
misunderstanding of Being is not illuminated, because 
it lies at the unexplored ontological level. Dasein’s 
competence to be itself and project itself into its own 
future possibilities is taken from the ‘they’. Its 
potential to be itself is, therefore, to find its own 
possibilities in the possibilities of thrownness. This 
misunderstanding in psychodynamic therapies will 
continue, with feelings being split-off from their 
context and seen as repressed or set aside, waiting for 
expression; with the idea that childhood can be re-
experienced in its original purity and context; with the 
idea of a purely cognitive approach to problems and 
the superiority of rationality. This propensity in 
Western thinking cannot be maintained without losing 
touch with what it is to exist as a human being (Cohn, 
2002). 
 
Based on Kernberg’s object relations model of BPD, 
Transference Focused Therapy has shown a reduction 
in suicidality and anger (Levy et al., 2006). Persons 
with BPD have a “split psychological structure” 
where “negative representations are split/segregated 
from idealized positive representations of self and 
others”, says Kernberg (Levy et al., 2006, p. 486). 
The putative global mechanism of change is the 
integration of these “object relations dyads” into a 
more coherent whole. This increased coherence 
results in a greater capacity for intimacy and 
reduction of self-destructive behaviours. From the 
therapist’s point of view, the mechanism of change 
consists of a structured treatment approach, using a 
treatment manual, clarification, confrontation and 
interpretation. Technical application of clarification, 
confrontation and interpretation is a recognized 
therapeutic method in most psycho-analytically 
informed psychodynamic therapies (Davanloo, 1978; 
Golden, 1978; Malan, 1978, 1979; Mann, 1978; 
Sifneos, 1978; Straker, 1978; Strupp, 1978; Yung, 
1978). The method rests on the theory that problems 
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have their origin in the past and are repeated, or 
inappropriately transferred into the present, until 
satisfied.  
 
Heidegger conceives of time as quite different from 
the mainstream conception of time as linear and 
calibrated as something we ‘have’ as a past, present 
and future. In his Being and Time (1927/1962), 
Heidegger claims that time is Being. We can only 
measure time because we already have such a thing as 
time, says Heidegger. The literal meaning of 
existence is “to stand out”, thus implying that human 
existence transcends its immediate situation. Cohn 
(2002) says that time is not a thread but a web which 
refers simultaneously to what is, what has been and 
what is to be. Our understanding of ourselves is 
imbued by all three dimensions all the time and 
defines our being. The present can therefore not be 
causally explained by past and future, nor is there a 
need for the ‘unconscious’ in which the past is 
waiting for expression. The past and the future are 
being expressed continually in our decisions and 
understanding of ourselves. Existential therapy 
focuses on the possibilities of existence, chosen in the 
light of our ‘givens’, such as mortality, being-in-the-
world, being-with-others and being-in-a-body. It is 
possible to choose differently, despite the givens of 
existence. Existential therapy aims to bring this home 
to the client with its proposition that the future, in 
contrast to the present or past, is the dominant mode 
of time for human beings (May, 1958). 
 
The technique of interpretation is, by all accounts, a 
learned and complex skill (Davanloo, 1978; Freud, 
1910/1962, 1979; Golden, 1978; Kernberg, 1975; 
Malan, 1978, 1979; Mann, 1978; Sifneos, 1978; 
Straker, 1978; Strupp, 1978; Yung, 1978). There 
appear to be so many things to consider whilst in a 
therapeutic conversation with another. In making an 
interpretation of the purportedly hidden content of an 
unfolding story, the therapist has to consider a variety 
of secondary constructs of understanding: defence 
mechanism or impulse? past conflict or present one? 
transference in vivo or with others outside? and so 
forth (Malan, 1979). The essence of a transference 
interpretation is that “the therapist does not respond to 
the patient’s fragmented one-dimensional partial 
representation but helps the patient observe it and the 
implied other that is paired with it” (Levy et al., 2006, 
p. 488).  
 
Being-with means that the individual can never be 
understood in isolation as in the aforementioned 
Cartesian-inspired conception of two independent 
subjects ‘relating’ to one another in a physical space, 
each with his or her own ideas and respective 
consciousness of the other. My being here and you 
being there is not being-with. Being-with is to 
“sojourn with you in the same being-here … not a 
relationship of a subject to another subject” 
(Heidegger, 2001, p. 112). Heidegger’s Being-with is 
thus referring to an existential relatedness which 
precedes any kind of particular relationship, such as, 
for instance, an empathic relationship or a 
transference relationship. Ontologically, we cannot 
but ‘be with’ others, but how we do this is another 
matter, says Cohn (2002). The concept of ‘care’ is a 
summary of the existential structures of Dasein and 
refers to the concern of Dasein for itself and for 
another Dasein. A particular mode of care - a 
deficient one  -  is relevant to mention here: that mode 
of care in which it ‘leaps in’ for the other. It takes 
over for the other in therapy that supports clients by 
the giving of advice and medication (Cohn, 2002). 
The kind of care - also a deficient mode - more 
attuned to the philosophy of existential therapy, is a 
care that ‘leaps ahead’ of the other, “not in order to 
take away his ‘care’ (of his own Dasein) but rather to 
give it back to him authentically for the first time” 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 159). Therapeutically, the 
concept of being-with suggests a more direct 
communication between therapist and client, where 
there is no need for the mediating scaffolds of 
representations, projections or transference to 
understand and be-with what meets the eye and the 
ear. The with-world is “a world of context, 
connections, mutuality and change in which you 
cannot ‘pin-point’ anything or look for single causes, 
specific origins and unique events” (Cohn, 2002, p. 
41). 
 
A most striking feature of the psychodynamic method 
is the highly technical language and theoretical 
concepts which refer to a multilayered hypothesis of 
human reality - which, when defined, amounts to 
what Todres (2002) describes as the depersonalization 
of the human order through objectification, 
compartmentalization and specialization. It raises the 
question whether a human encounter is possible 
where the therapist - as sole expert of mystifying 
lexicon and conceptualization of being human - 
constricts the freedom to explore and understand 
experiences as they unfold in conversation. So many 
presuppositions, assumptions, judgments and 
compartmentalizations cannot but obscure and 
conceal what is actually before the therapist and the 
client. It is also questionable whether a spontaneous 
and authentic human encounter between two whole 
people is possible when they become ‘observers’ of 
the ‘partial representations’ of one of the observers 
suffering ‘unmetabolized emotions’, in order to 
integrate the ‘object relations dyads’ that purportedly 
belong to the ‘split psychic structure’ of this fellow 
observer. It seems to me that psychoanalytic theory in 
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its practice has achieved what all the King’s horses 
and all the King’s men for so long have failed to do. 
Through meticulous naming, ordering and 
classification, things have been put together once 
again. Is it, however, Humpty Dumpty? 
 
It is the therapeutic relationship that is the most 
important and overriding factor in the treatment of 
suicidal people in all forms of therapy (Leenaars, 
2006; Michel, Dey, Stadler, & Valach, 2004; Reeves 
& Seber, 2004). The traditional medical model leaves 
the needs of suicidal patients unmet through an 
experience-distant encounter. The therapist is the sole 
expert. The model is linear and causal; regrettably, 
people - and, for that matter, nature - are not 
(Leenaars, 2006). 
 
According to Needleman (in Binswanger, 1975), the 
actuality, possibilities and limits of psychiatry in its 
practice are not sufficiently clear to itself, because it 
rests upon two incompatible conceptual horizons. 
From its natural-scientific (mainly biological) horizon 
of understanding, its ‘object’ of treatment is the ‘sick’ 
organism; and, in its practice of psychotherapy, it 
views its object of treatment as the human being, that 
is, from an anthropological horizon of understanding. 
The situation can only be put right by going behind 
both conceptual horizons and grounding our 
understanding in the being of Dasein. It is in this 
regard that Heidegger’s phenomenological-
philosophical analytic of existence is important to 
psychiatry and psychology, because it does not 
inquire merely into the particular regions of 
phenomena and fact to be found ‘in human beings’, 
but, rather, inquires into the being of man as a whole 
(Binswanger, 1975). It is a philosophical approach 
that encourages the science of psychiatry and 
psychology to understand mankind by means of one 
ontological insight. It obviates the separation of mind, 
body and spirit. 
 
Unlike therapies positioned in the natural scientific 
paradigm, an existential-phenomenological approach 
emphasizes understanding rather than explanation. 
Phenomena are kept intact to ‘speak for themselves’ 
rather than being ‘atomized’ to transform what is 
present into decontextualized representations. What 
distinguishes existential-phenomenological therapy 
from others are the attitude and intention of the 
therapist. Attitude and intention are perhaps best 
defined in terms of the difference between technique 
and practice. The attitude behind technique is “that 
we cannot trust what meets the eye and the ear … we 
need to devise interpretative means to decipher the 
phenomena” (Cohn, 2002, p. 115). But, according to 
Cohn, there is nothing else to look for other than what 
meets the eye and the ear; “practice, so to speak, (is 
the) other side of our beliefs” (2002, p. 116). Practice 
is the enactment of our beliefs, and technique 
becomes necessary when there is a gap between belief 
and enactment. This attitude (of disbelief) ushers in 
the intention to help a human being whilst regarding 
him as an organism, and results in the mechanized 
and dehumanizing techniques of therapy so easily 
recognized in the science of prescriptive psycho-
therapy. In existential-phenomenological therapy, 
there is no technique, only understanding and the 
‘lighting up’ of the existential structures of Dasein 
and its dis-ease with being-in-the-world. 
  
The Phenomenon of Suicide 
 
The categorical error in CBT/DBT and psycho-
dynamic therapies with regard to suicide is that they 
are working with only the ontic manifestation of the 
phenomenon. Whilst their explanations, associations 
and correlations of the ontic appeal to reason, they 
fail to uncover the existential structures of this kind of 
existence. For Husserl, to discover the essence of 
phenomena - to show themselves for themselves - 
requires a ‘bracketing’ of the variants of experience 
(Cohn, 2002; White, 2005). But, for Heidegger, it is 
the very experience of Being-in-the-world that 
defines human existence, and understanding the 
essence of phenomena has to take this into account. 
 
The phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic - an 
interpretation. In the natural sciences, objects can be 
reduced to basic rules which explain why something 
appears, behaves or reacts the way it does, as is the 
wont of the therapies under discussion with their 
cause-and-effect arguments. But Heidegger (1927/ 
1962) argues that human beings are not objects that 
can be understood in this manner. To understand 
phenomena - as they appear to humans - and to 
understand the nature of the phenomenon of being 
human in itself, requires a different method of 
inquiry. The method required is that of interpretation, 
because phenomena are not always accurate in 
showing themselves. A phenomenology of Dasein has 
to account for this and bear in mind the possible 
structures of a phenomenon and how it shows itself 
from itself. (1) Phenomena can ‘seem to be’, for 
instance a desert mirage. (2) Phenomena can ‘appear 
to be’, for instance through symptom formation. (3) 
Phenomena can be ‘mere appearance’; for example, 
the categories of our perception prevent us from 
seeing anything outside such categories (Cavalier, 
2006). These structures of phenomena nevertheless 
articulate or direct one to the phenomena as such, and 
Heidegger’s phenomenology aims to wrest the 
phenomenon from these phenomenal plains - 
transcend them through interpretation - in order to 
arrive at phenomenological truth (transcendental 
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truth) (Cavalier, 2006).  
 
There are two kinds of phenomena: ontic and 
ontological. “Ontological phenomena, therefore, are 
primary [in the order of being], but secondary in [the 
order of] being thought and seen” (Heidegger, 2001, 
p. 6). The ontological is not hidden behind the ontic, 
but is included in it, and our understanding has access 
to it even though we may not be able to articulate it, 
says Cohn (2002). Whatever belongs to Being as such 
is ontological, and whatever describes being is ontic. 
What the therapist encounters is ontic; it is how 
someone has chosen to respond to the ontological or 
existential ‘givens’ of life. “The decisive point is that 
the particular phenomena, arising in the relationship 
between the analysand and the analyst, and belonging 
to the respective, concrete patient, be broached in 
their own phenomenological content and not simply 
be classified globally under existentials” (Heidegger, 
2001, p. 124).  
 
Upon what basis does one attempt to gain a deeper 
understanding of what suicidality may mean? If 
suicidality is an ontic phenomenon, then Heidegger 
begins to reveal the ontological basis of this 
phenomenon when he says that the very experience of 
Being-in-the-world defines human existence. An 
understanding of the suicidal person requires an 
understanding of how s/he has come to exist as s/he 
does and how s/he has chosen to respond to the 
existential ‘givens’ of life. 
  
The end of a person’s life, when that person ceases to 
exist, is ‘demise’ and is an ontic event. Heidegger, 
however, does not have this in mind in his 
conceptualization of death. Thinking of death 
(demise) is the inauthentic denial of death, according 
to Dreyfus (in White, 2005). The ontological ground 
of death is anxiety, in Heidegger’s view. Dreyfus 
quotes Heidegger: “Dasein’s being … is an ability-to-
be. The end or limit of this ability is the inability-to-
be. The condition Heidegger calls ‘death’ is a limit-
situation for that ability-to-be, one in which one 
confronts this limitation … this situation occurs when 
Dasein is beset by anxiety, in which none of its 
possibilities matters to it differentially, in which all 
are equally irrelevant to it” (in White, 2005, p. xix). 
The person may find him or herself unable to resolve 
the situation. It is a crisis in which Dasein cannot 
resolutely accept the collapse of its world, its way of 
life, so as to be open to disclosing a new world in 
which the anomalies of living existence make sense 
(White, 2005). This is the end of an existence, an 
‘existential end’. 
 
It is argued that suicide is the ontic event which refers 
to this ontological ‘limit situation’, where the person 
cannot make a decision and the decision makes him. 
This is the person of “enclosing reserve” that 
Kierkegaard (1849/1983) refers to, the person who 
“marks time on the spot, who goes on living hour 
after hour but never gets beyond that”, and whose 
“greatest danger is suicide”. It means that suicide 
becomes the necessary fulfilment of an existence 
ruled by the past, leaving an empty present and its 
being cut off from the future. Existential ripening can 
only be determined by the future (Binswanger, 1958). 
Binswanger says that, where the life which is yet to 
be lived is ruled by the past, we speak of old age, but 
where the life-meaning of Dasein has already been 
fulfilled in early years, existential aging has hurried 
ahead of biological aging, and death is then the 
necessary fulfilment of the life-meaning of such an 
existence. This kind of limit-situation is not 
necessarily the either-or situation of authenticity and 
inauthenticity. Heidegger does not make this value 
judgment. He only refers to the “suffering in which 
the essential otherness of what-is reveals itself in 
opposition to the tried and usual”, says Dreyfus (in 
White, 2005). The otherness of what-is can be 
experienced in both modalities of Being-in-the-world, 
authentic and inauthentic. 
 
“Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its ownmost 
Being-thrown and reveals the uncannyness of 
everyday familiar Being-in-the-world” (Heidegger, 
1927/1962, p. 393). The phenomenon of anxiety is a 
basic state of mind (mood) and an existential structure 
of Dasein. It is the mood that assails one when 
suddenly one is confronted with the unfamiliar 
(uncannyness) of everyday existence. The person 
unexpectedly no longer feels ‘at home’. It is a 
moment for resolution. It is a moment of confronting 
‘nothing’, when Dasein recognizes that it is capable 
of re-experiencing and redefining its very own 
possibility to-be within the possibilities available by 
also Being-they. This is an uncanny place and a 
realization of Being-thrown from the very start. This 
uncanny place, or place where one does not feel at 
home, is the place of freedom; it is between 
possibility and actuality. For Kierkegaard, this 
freedom is anxiety or the wretchedness of spirit, a 
“sickness unto death”. It is an unavoidable existential 
of the human condition, where every “moment of 
despair is traceable to possibility; every moment he is 
in despair he is bringing it upon himself” (1849/1983, 
p. 17). This leads me to the thought that suicidality 
may be born in a mood of fear in seeing the 
uncovered truth of existential loneliness. When 
Dasein discovers the world in its own way, it breaks 
up the disguises with which Dasein bars its own way; 
it becomes conspicuous and is no longer 
accommodated by the ‘they’ and is no longer able to 
misunderstand itself. Fear is a kind of mood which 
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colours the way in which Dasein projects itself into 
the future. It is a state of mind that discloses the world 
of Dasein in a particular mood. The meaning and 
significance of what is disclosed is imbued by this 
mood of fear. It is the ground upon which 
understanding takes place. “Fearing, as a slumbering 
possibility of Being-in-the-world in a state-of-mind, 
has already disclosed the world, in that out of it 
something like the fearsome may come close” 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 180). Thus, the first part of 
fear is that which we are afraid of, the possibility, and 
not the actual. It is a projecting forward onto 
possibilities. The second part of fear is what it is 
afraid about, and, in the case of Dasein, it is always 
for itself. The characteristic of fear is threat, says 
Heidegger, and, in the case of Dasein, it is threat to its 
existence. There are variations of fear, such as 
shyness, timidity or misgiving. But all “modifications 
of fear, as possibilities of having a state-of-mind, 
point to the fact that Dasein’s Being-in-the-world is 
‘fearful’” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 182). For the 
suicidal person, it is the growing dominance of the 
past over the existence which is theirs. With the 
supremacy of the already-been, the future becomes 
nonreferential. “In other words, the existence no 
longer finds anything there from which and by which 
it could understand itself … [it] exists in the mode of 
dread … in naked horror” (Binswanger, 1958, p. 
305). 
 
Understanding of the suicidal person requires an 
understanding of his or her existence, how s/he has 
chosen to respond to the existential ‘givens’ of life. 
Our ‘thrownness’ is the unchosen basis of our 
freedom to make choices, where one discovers that in 
despair one “cannot die … [Despair] cannot consume 
the eternal, the self at the root of despair, whose 
worm does not die and whose fire is not quenched” 
(Kierkegaard, 1849/1983, p. 18). Here I propose that 
we read “the eternal” in the wretchedness of spirit of 
Kierkegaard to mean possibility (May, 1977). It is for 
this reason that existential therapists, unlike those 
discussed, place ‘time’ in the centre of their attempt 
to understand, because “anxiety, depression, and joy, 
occur more in the dimension of time than space” 
(May, 1958, p. 65). 
 
What people express in therapy often, then, refers to 
‘one’s thrownness’ and how the person has exercised 
his or her freedom and choice. Discussing choices 
made and choices neglected opens new possibilities 
once again. “This creates a place for change within 
therapy that, in my view, even the most meticulous 
reconstruction of the problem’s origin does not offer” 
(Cohn, 2002, p. 100). With each decision, one dies 
and is born anew; it is to die and yet not to die, to die 
death. I think that ‘to die death’ is the anxious 
lingering in the uncanny, at the cusp of the kind of 
fear which can overcome and seemingly extinguish 
all possibilities. It augurs the end of an existence of 
misunderstanding, and it is no longer able to ‘comport 
oneself’ as it used to. Discussing choices made or 
neglected requires one to remember that: “Dasein is 
an entity which, in its very Being, comports itself 
understandingly towards that Being … (it is) … an 
entity which in each case I myself am” (Heidegger, 
1927/1962, p. 78). Dasein is that Being that is mine 
and comports (conducts or behaves) itself towards its 
Being. Characterizing Dasein in this manner has a 
double consequence (Heidegger, 1927/1962): 
   
(1) The essence of this entity lies in its ‘to be’, in 
other words, in its existence. A human being is a 
‘who’, an entity that exists differently to a thing-
like entity. If we are going to get to Dasein, then 
we have to get to it from its ownness, as opposed 
to examining it from the outside as another thing 
in the world (Waters, 2005). 
(2) This existence ‘that is mine’ also emphasizes the 
responsibility that Dasein has in choosing how 
to comport itself towards its Being. Dasein is its 
possibility and it has this possibility, and 
because “Dasein is in each case essentially its 
own possibility, it can, in its very being, 
‘choose’ itself and win itself; it can also lose 
itself and never win itself; or only ‘seem’ to do 
so” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 68). 
 
The therapeutic understanding of the phenomenon of 
suicidality at an existential level begins with ‘a 
clearing’ where the suicidal person finds himself 
marking time on the spot. It is when the three ex-
stasies of human temporality (Binswanger, 1958) 
have fallen out of kilter - Having-been (past) and 
Being-with (present) outweighing being-ahead-of-
oneself (future) - that the person no longer feels at 
home. How it has come to be like that belongs to a 
story of living which can only be told by those who 
experience it. In believing one’s eyes and ears during 
the telling, the tale becomes a discourse of original 
understanding. It is within this kind of understanding-
together, which does not pretend to know, that a 
different existential what, how and who can be born. 
We can only begin to understand suicide in the 
relating with another human being, and in psychology 




In this paper, I suggest that it may have been 
scientific psychology that pushed Mr. Dumpty off the 
wall with a preconceived idea of how he should be 
put together again. But this, I argue, was not 
necessary at all, because he was sufficiently whole to 
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start with. As practitioners, we have become so 
insecure about what our eyes and ears observe that we 
no longer appreciate or trust the who in our presence. 
Our understanding of the nature of being human is in 
fragments at the base of the imposing and almost 
impenetrable theoretical edifice of mankind. Those 
we put together no longer resemble who they are. 
There is a disjunction between our understanding and 
our doing. This disjunction is most evident in the 
cognitive-behavioural and psychodynamic therapies 
of suicidality. Existential-phenomenological therapy 
avoids this through its reliance on one ontological 
insight into the nature of being human. Who in 
treatment becomes primary once again, and two 
people are able to meet one another as someone 
present. It allows for a glimpse into how we have 
come to misunderstand who we essentially are and 
the possibilities this may hold for the other. This 
attitude fosters a human encounter that is direct and 
personal, the very ‘mechanism of change’ valued by 
those who struggle with suicidal thoughts and 
intentions. Suicide is both problem and mystery for 
the therapist in practice. Problems can and should be 
solved, whilst mysteries cannot be. We can only 
relate to mysteries, dwell in them, and take part in the 
expressed suffering of the suicidal patient in order to 
console him and confirm his sense of life (Talseth, 
Jacobsson, & Norberg, 2000). Therapy should attempt 
to mix natural scientific knowledge with knowledge 
about a unique person. The art is to know by what 
quantity, and to wisely recognize when a problem is a 
mystery. This acknowledgement in itself is life 
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